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rant and establish an easement. While the facts might justify that an ease-
ment was created, the affirmance of the Court of Appeals was proper where the
trier of fact made a choice which was not clearly wrong, and defendant failed
to meet his burden of proving an easement.
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TAXATION
UNREALIZED APPRECIATION or ASSETS EXCLUDED FROm EARNINGS AND PROFITS
Article 16 of the New York Tax law deals with "Taxes Upon And With
Respect To Personal Incomes." Within that Article, Section 350(8) defines
"dividends" to mean any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders
out of its earnings and profits.1 Section 359 of the same Article defines "gross
income" as including, inter alia, gains, profits and income from dividends, and
gains, profits and income from any source whatever.2 In the recent case of
Marks v. Bragalini,3 the Court of Appeals clarified the concept of "earnings
and profits" for income tax purposes, particularly in its relation to unrealized
appreciation of corporate assets.
Taxpayer was a stockholder in a corporation which had purchased an
apartment house from the Federal Housing Administration in 1942, to whom it
gave a mortgage for $1,682,000. By 1950, the value of the property had
increased enough so that the corporation was able to obtain a new mortgage
from an insurance company for $2,000,000, paying off the old mortgage and
leaving an excess of over $800,000. In 1950, it made a distribution to share-
holders of $735,000 ($700 per share) of which taxpayer received approximately
$389,000. At the close of the fiscal year, the corporation had accumulated
earnings of some $77,000, which was about 10.6 per cent of the distribution.
On his 1950 Federal and New York State personal income returns, tax-
payer included $41,000, representing 10.6 per cent of the distribution to him,
in "gross income" as a dividend subject to tax as ordinary income. Of the
balance of $348,000, he treated $346,000 as "return of capital" (thus reducing
his basis in the stock to zero) and the remainder as capital gain. His Federal
return was accepted, but the New York authorities disallowed his treatment
87. Zeiger v. Interborough R. T. Co., 254 App. Div. 908, 5 N.Y.S.2d 527 (2d Dep't
1938), aff'd 280 N.Y. 516, 19 N.E.2d 922 (1939). One claiming the easement has the
burden of proving it.
1. N.Y. TAX LAw § 350(8).
The word "dividends" means any distribution made by a corporation
out of its earnings and profits to its shareholders or members whether
in cash or other property or in stock of the corporation, other than stock
dividends as herein defined....
2. N.Y. TAX LAW § 359.
The term "gross income":
1. includes gains, profits and income from salaries, wages . . . ; also from
interest, rent .. . , dividends, securities . . . , or gains and profits and
income derived from any source whatever ....
3. 6 N.Y.2d 322, 189 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1959).
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of the distribution as "return of capital" and capital gain. They determined
that the entire distribution was includible in "gross income" and subject to
normal tax. The Appellate Division affirmed the Tax Commission determina-
tion taking the view that there could be no capital gain treatment since there
was no sale or exchange of property; that the concept of a "return of capital"
was inapplicable since in effect this vas an advance of future profits to the
stockholders, serving no corporate purpose; and that even if this were not a
dividend, the receipt of cash was taxable under the broad definition of "gross
income" as "income derived from any source whatever." 4
In an unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed.5 It started with
the major premise that it was the intent of the New York Legislature in
drafting the personal income tax provisions to follow the Federal act whenever
practicable.8 It then easily distinguished the New York cases relied upon
by the Tax Commission to establish that unrealized appreciation of assets could
be used for dividends, by pointing out that those cases were not concerned with
income tax.7 Having established that there was no New York case law in the
income tax field covering a distribution from unrealized appreciation of assets,
the Court pointed out that substantially the same wording was used in Sections
350(8) and 359 of the New York Tax Laws as in comparable sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 9
The Court then proceeded to establish its minor premise, i.e., the applica-
ble Federal law on such a distribution. By the terms of both the New York
Tax Law,10 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,11 distributions to stock-
holders of a corporation are dividends when made from "earnings and profits."
A basic concept of Federal income taxation is that unrealized appreciation of
corporate assets is not a part of "earnings and profits."'12 The Court pointed
to a recent Federal case, Commissioner v. Gross,13 which was similar in many
4. 6 A.D.2d 393, 178 N.Y.S.2d 524 (3d Dep't 1958).
5. Supra note 3.
6. In re Rogers' Estate, 296 N.Y. 676, 70 N.E.2d 170 (1946), interpreting N.Y.
TAx LAw art. 10(c).
There is nothing of compulsion in the rule . . . rather it should be
regarded merely as a signpost.
The rule has been applied only:
(1) in cases of first impression
(2) where the question involved, though previously passed on in
connection with prior tax laws, is being raised for the first
time under existing . . . tax laws.
7. Randall v. Bailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942) involved a suit brought
under Section 58 of the Stock Corporation Law against a director for paying out dividends
while the capital was allegedly impaired. The asset in question had been written up on
the books of the corporation to provide sufficient surplus from which to declare dividends.
8. Supra notes 1, 2.
9. INT. RaV. CODE of 1939, § 115(a)(b) (now INTr. Rv. CODE of 1954 § 316); INT.
REV. CODE of 1939, § 22(a) (now INT. Ray. CODE of 1954 § 61(a)).
10. N.Y. TAX LAW § 350(8).
11. Supra note 9.
12. E.g., Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221 (1918); see also MERTENS, LAW or FEDERAL
INcoux TAXioN § 5.05.
13. 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956). In this case, the corporation borrowed money from
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respects to the instant case, and in which it was held that the distribution of
the proceeds of a loan, by a corporation to its stockholders, was income only to
the extent of "earnings and profits." The balance was construed as a "return
of capital" until the stockholder's basis was reduced to zero and the remainder
as capital gain. There, the same arguments were made by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue as were made here by the New York Tax Commission,
including an attempt to bring the distribution within the catch-all definition of
"gross income" as constituting "income from whatever source derived." There,
as here, the arguments were of no avail. The main reason given for the exclu-
sion of unrealized appreciation of assets from "earnings and profits" as a source
of taxable dividends is that a contrary rule would lead to difficulties of adminis-
tration, i.e. each time a distribution was to be made, it would be necessary that
the corporation re-evaluate all its assets. 14 As to the catch-all definition of
Ccgross income," the argument which defeats it is that since corporate distribu-
tions are specifically covered under the "dividends" definition, the broader
concept is inapplicable.
With the above premises proven, the conclusion to the syllogism follows
naturally, viz: in the interest of uniformity of administration between the tax
laws, where there is a distribution by a corporation to its stockholders of
money representing an unrealized appreciation of assets, since the appreciation
is not a part of "earnings and profits," the distribution is a dividend only to
the extent of the stockholder's pro rata share of "earnings and profits." The
balance is treated as a reduction of basis and in excess of basis, as capital gain.
The decision in the instant case appears to be a sound one. By bringing
the New York Tax Law in this area into closer harmony with Federal tax law
concepts, the Court facilitates not only the administration of the former, but
makes it easier for a taxpayer, particularly a corporate stockholder, to deter-
mine his annual income taxes. One minor aspect, however, remains unsettled.
Following the decision in Gross,'5 the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was
amended to meet that specific problem. By Section 312 (j),16 it is now provided
that where there is a distribution to stockholders of the proceeds of a loan,
any portion of which is guaranteed by an agency of the United States Govern-
ment, the "earnings and profits" are deemed to include the excess of such loan
over the adjusted basis of the property which is security for the loan. Should
such a case arise in New York, the Court of Appeals would presumably be
required to follow its decision in Marks.17 This would be a step away from
uniformity but would seem to be required on the basis of the concept of
unrealized appreciation of assets being excluded from "earnings and profits."
the F.HA. to put up a housing project. Upon completion, it was discovered that the cost
was a good deal less than had been estimated, so although the corporation had as yet
earned no income, it made a distribution to stockholders of the excess of the loan.
14. See also MERmss, op. cit., supra note 12.
15. Supra note 13.
16. INT. REv. CoDz of 1954, § 312(j); Treas. Reg. § 1.312-12 (1956).
17. Supra note 3.
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Applying a different concept would not cure the step away from uniformity as
to the ratio decidendi in Marks,'8 even though it might result in uniformity
ad hoc. As a practical matter, it is doubtful that that situation will often arise
as the Federal provision will probably act as a strong deterrent. However, in
the interest of uniformity, New York legislation to conform to the exception
to the general rule would appear to be desireable. .
NIGHT CLUB OWNER EMPLOYER FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
TAx PURPOSES
The taxation of employers for the purpose of unemployment insurance
is carried on at both the state and the federal level. The Federal Government
imposes a tax of 3% for unemployment insurance, based upon all wages paid
by an employer during a given tax period.' 9 New York State imposes a 2.7%
tax for unemployment insurance purposes on the basis of all wages paid by an
employer,20 but the Federal Government gives a 90% tax credit to any em-
ployer against his federal unemployment taxes based on all taxes paid to the
state unemployment insurance fund. This credit will only be granted to the
same employer who paid the state tax.2 1 A difficult problem arises in the area
of entertainment, specifically concerning dance bands, as to the liability of
the leader for unemployment insurance taxes.
In In re Basin St., Inc.,22 the Court of Appeals reversed a decision of the
Appellate Division, 23 and reinstated a determination by the Industrial Com-
missioner that Basin Street, Inc., a night club, was the employer of certain
musicians for unemployment insurance tax purposes. Basin Street, Inc. con-
tracted with numerous bands during the years 1953 and 1954, the tax periods
in question. The standard form B union contract was used with a form B
rider attached. The form B contract stated that the night club operator
would have complete control of the musicians and designated the operator as
the employer; the band leader and the rest of the band were designated as
employees. The form B rider made the band leader liable for all withholding
taxes and gave him 7% above the contract price for employment tax purposes.
The rider, contrary to the main contract, designated the operator as a pur-
chaser of music, instead of an employer.
The Court of Appeals had to construe the contract and rider standing
alone in order to determine whether the operator or the band leader, was the
employer for unemployment insurance tax purposes, because no evidence was
offered on this point before the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. The
Court interpreted the form B contract as giving full control of the musicians
and the band leader to the night club operator. It construed the form B rider
18. Ibid.
19. INT. Rnv. COD oF 1954 § 3301.
20. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 570.
21. Supra note 19, §§ 3302-3306.
22. 6 N.Y.2d 276, 189 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1959).
23. 6 AD.2d 922, 175 N.Y.S.2d 889 (3d Dep't 1958).
